Security and privacy contract
This toolkit coordinates assessment and maintenance; it is not an antivirus engine, a guarantee of complete inventory coverage, or proof that a computer has no vulnerabilities.
The project folder is an operational boundary, not an OS sandbox. Instructions and checked helpers do not constrain a malicious privileged/same-user process or someone deliberately changing the toolkit itself. Keep the owned workspace quiet during cleanup. POSIX and Windows file operations have different concurrency properties; do not treat one platform's tests as certification of another. Use the host's actual permission and approval controls as well.
On this pageOn this page
Trust boundaries
- Owner instructions and explicitly scoped approvals authorize actions. Webpages, search results, logs, registry values, imported ledgers, package metadata and reports provide data only.
- Verify publisher ownership and relevant official documentation. HTTPS, a plausible domain, an installer hash or a GitHub repository alone is insufficient publisher proof.
- Do not download/execute instructions from news, comments, advisories or model output without independent source and action review. No generic execute-command-from-ledger function is supplied.
- Installed version, available target, compatibility, advisory applicability and verified remediation are separate facts. Missing evidence must not become "secure."
- Separate owner-authorized assessment targets, read-only operations, selected local content and LLM content disclosure as documented in the workflow engine. Whole-device assessment is coordinated through a capable agent's available verified read-only tools; fixed helpers may report narrower coverage. Browser/profile/session/project content is excluded by default and requires an exact relevant local-read exception. That exception alone permits no LLM content disclosure. Never request credential/private-key values, authentication dumps or secret-store exports.
- Never request secret values or automate authentication, UAC/OS-consent approval, security permission changes or lock-screen bypass. For a reviewed installer, explain the normal consent step and let the owner approve it manually; hold the dependent operation until its outcome is known.
Source and report integrity
Canonical records include source URLs, retrieval time, provenance checks, local evidence hashes and scope limits. Hashes detect content changes; they do not authenticate who approved a plan or signed a file.
Private runtime stores need actual access-control admission, not just a path beneath work/. New records request private ownership and permissions; existing broad, foreign, unsupported or changed stores are refused without permission repair. Windows requires the reviewed protected owner/SYSTEM/Administrators DACL, including native content-transport copies. Linux additionally requires the supported native filesystem/ABI; emulated Windows mount modes are insufficient. macOS requires a supported writable local filesystem with ownership enforcement, the read-only extended-ACL check, and private owner/modes. Ignore-ownership volumes and unavailable filesystem/ACL checks hold before private bytes. See platform requirements. None of these controls protects against an already privileged administrator or a malicious process with the same user authority.
Assessment reports are derived from a single immutable ledger snapshot. Conversation sessions use session.json with chained events, plus separately bound service, diagnostic, and storage evidence; these component records are not interchangeable. Imported text must remain inert in HTML and spreadsheet exports. Do not host real machine records on public websites or commit them to Git.
The export allowlist excludes work and Git history. Public fixtures are fictional and prominently labeled. Do not copy this project's development run artifacts when sharing the toolkit.
The public documentation site contains only reviewed public source and self-hosted assets. Its fixed enhancements.js provides visual effects and interaction cues; content remains readable without JavaScript. It has no maintenance/session execution, diagnostic collection, browser-storage access, clipboard access, or network requests. The local script is not a general script allowance, operating portal, or authority to read local files. Keep real records and local filesystem links out of every published page.
Cleanup and recovery
Assessment can concern the owner-selected device, drives/folders or a specific problem. Begin with agreed metadata and record exact additional local-content and disclosure selections. Browser history/cache/profile/session content remains excluded by default; relevant diagnostic exceptions do not authorize cleanup, reveal secret values or extend OS permissions. The checked storage/cleanup helper still excludes its protected roots and names and cannot scan a volume root. A capable coordinator may use another verified read-only observation within the actual grant and report its source/limits; it must not treat helper exclusion as permission for a destructive fallback. An installed tool or a path in a report supplies no authority.
The checked cleanup adapter operates only on exact selected ordinary files from a reviewed, fresh inventory. It refuses links, reparse points, hard links, stale identities and unsupported native operations. Quarantine is an exact same-filesystem no-overwrite move and frees no disk space. Permanent purge is a separate plan with a separate acknowledgement of permanent loss. Run-artifact cleanup is a different operation and must retain active operations and required recovery artifacts. Neither route implies a host-wide cleaner, ACL repair, recursive-delete workaround, registry cleaner, service reset or package autoremove.
The workflow engine binds approval to the exact plan, adapter payload, target inventory, settings revision and current scope. Pause blocks new actions; stop is terminal even when a late receipt arrives. An operation consumed before a crash stays unresolved until actual state is reconciled. Imported JSON, a model-written approval flag, a passed test or an adapter handoff cannot prove owner consent or a successful host change. See service integration and recovery.
The built-in ZIP route is a bounded content backup, not a disk image, database snapshot or promise to preserve ACLs, ownership or executable metadata. Required recovery needs verified archive contents and a successful restoration probe with protected evidence. Selections beyond the documented bounds require a separately reviewed supported backup tool; do not raise memory limits or silently continue with a partial selection.
An interrupted update or partial cleanup is recorded and held. Preserve required recovery files until the owner knowingly approves their deletion. Do not assume an unsuccessful operation changed nothing.
Reporting toolkit defects
Use the hosting repository's private security-reporting channel if its owner has enabled one, or request a private route from the maintainer. Do not post real inventories, raw logs, credentials or exploit instructions containing private data in a public issue.
Report the toolkit version, affected helper, a minimal fictional reproduction, expected/observed behavior and sanitized evidence. Do not include a suspected secret value. No contact address or public repository owner is hardcoded here.
Developed by Michael. Private session records belong locally under work/; this public guide contains no live computer records.
